When
Walterstorff discusses Rawls’s political liberalism, he is very critical to the
idea of political conception of justice as fairness as freestanding principle.
At first, he refuses the idea that it is not possible for us, either as liberal
theorist or as common people, to remove our comprehensive perspectives from our
programming, to deposit them in memory, and then, using only the light of our
common human reason, to analyzes the ideas of our political culture and
elaborate those ideas into principle of justice. Walterstroff thinks this idea
is impossible to work out because he believes that it is difficult to expect
that many of reasonable and rational citizens would accept those principles, or
even some of them would do so. As a result we cannot develop the political
conception of justice (Walterstorff, 99).
Secondly,
he finds that the independent sources proposed by the proponent of liberal
position fails to solve some of the important and contentious political issues.
Even, these independent sources are simply irrelevant and have nothing to say
to some problems we face today. To support his position he refers to Kent
Greenawalt's studies.[1]
Here among the others he finds data showing that the independent source cannot
give an adequate answer to the issues of welfare assistance (Greenawalt 1988,
173-174). Moreover he is very disappointed to know that the idea of liberal
democracy has nothing to say about the controversy concerning the issue of abortion
(Greenawalt 1988, 120-137). It is of the liberal democracy’s fundamental ideas
that all persons are to be granted with equal protection under the law, but it
makes no contribution to save the fetus (Walterstorff, 103-104).
Thirdly,
Waltersorff thinks that it is not equitable that citizens should refrain
from using their comprehensive
perspectives and use, instead the freestanding sources in public debate. The
reasons are, first it is part of a religious belief that adherents of religion
are ought to base their decision
concerning the fundamental issue of justice on their religious conviction; and
second it is not easy job to detect whether or not an argument proposed by the
utilitarian or the nationalist part of his comprehensive perspectives (Walterstorff,
105).
Fourthly,
Walterstorff cannot accept Rawls’s rationale for the idea of restrain on the
use of reasons based on comprehensive doctrines. Rawls says that in order to
treat partners in political discussion as free and equal and to respect them, we
must refrain from comprehensive convictions and use only the independent
source. Walterstorff refuses this idea and maintains that it is still an
acceptable practice within liberal democracy to discuss issues on the basis of
people’s convictions and to reach the agreement whether through consensus or
voting. Contrary to Rawls’s idea, it is even considered as more respecting to
the partners if we allow them to present their reasons on the basis of what
they believe as true than on the basis of the independent source which they may
not agree upon (Walterstoff, 105-109).
Several
times Walterstorff insists that there is no restrain on applying the religious
reason in political discussion. However, it does not mean that there is not
restriction at all. He agrees on the necessity of the regulation when people
are conducting a public debate. The restriction, however, must be set only in
the manner of discussion and in the way to conduct it, that it ought to be in
accordance with the civility (Walterstorff, 111).
Finally,
he disagrees with Rawls on the way to solve the issues. To settle the disputed
issues Rawls begins with establishing an agreement on the political conception
of justice as the basis for discussion. In the contrary, Walterstorff says
there is no need to reach consensus on the basis for discussion. Rather we
discuss a particular issue and aim at achieving agreement concerning that
particular issue alone. We settle the problem casuistically and at ad hoc
basis. (Walterstorff, 113-114).
Rejecting
Rawls’s proposal, Waterstorff, then, advances the Consocial Position as the
alternative and defines it as follow:
The
consosial position agrees with the liberal position and opposes the
competition-of-interests position concerning the goal of political discussion,
decisions, and actions: the goal is political justice. But it departs from the
liberal position on two defining issues. First, it repudiates the quest for
independent source and imposes no moral restraint on the use of religious
reasons. And second, it interprets the neutrality requirement, that the state
be neutral with respect to religious and other comprehensive perspectives
present in society, as requiring
impartiality rather than separation (Walterstorff,
115).
[1] Two works of Ken Greenawalt
referred by Walterstorff are Religious
Conviction and Political Choices (1988) and Private Consciences and Public Reasons (1995).